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In the popular mind, metaphysics is often characterized as the philosophical
theory of everything that pertains to the Beyond, to what is beyond experi-
ence – God, the soul, the spiritual, belief in the afterlife (Adorno, 2000, p. 6).
No doubt this is what led F. H. Bradley to quip that metaphysics is simply an
attempt to find bad reasons for what one is going to believe anyway (cited in
van Inwagen, 2002, p. 14). Translated into philosophical terms, this would
imply that metaphysics is a philosophy of the transcendent as opposed to
the immanent. Nietzsche famously ridiculed metaphysics as a doctrine that
assumes the existence of a world behind or beyond the world that we know
and can know (the ‘two worlds’). In Zarathustra, he dubbed this other world
the Hinterwelt, the ‘back-world’, and he called those metaphysicians who con-
cerned themselves with this other world Hinterwelter, ‘backworldsmen’ (an
allusion to the word ‘backwoodsmen’, Hinterwälder) (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 142).1
Nietzsche’s target was primarily Platonism: behind the world of phenomena
or appearances, there was supposed to be concealed a truly real, permanent
and unchanging world of essences, existing in itself, and the task of meta-
physics was to unravel and reveal this other transcendent world. In this
regard, metaphysics can be seen to be the result of a secularization of mythical
and magical thinking – Plato’s Ideas have been called gods turned into con-
cepts (Adorno, 2000, pp. 5, 18).
Yet it would be simplistic to identify metaphysics with transcendence tout
court. In its most general sense, metaphysics is an attempt to determine the
constitutive structures of Being on the basis of thought alone, and thus it is a
form of philosophy that takes concepts (or Ideas or Forms) as its object. This is
why, from the start, metaphysics has been intertwined with problems of logic
and epistemology, culminating in Hegel’s teaching that logic and metaphys-
ics were really one and the same, immanent to each other. It is true that in
Plato, the most transcendent of metaphysicians, these concepts were deemed
to be of a higher order of being than existing things; yet even in Plato’s late
period, one can already find the phenomenal world asserting itself increas-
ingly against the Idea, perhaps under Aristotle’s growing influence. The pri-
mary object of metaphysics, in other words, is not transcendence per se but
rather the relation between transcendence and immanence, between essence
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and existence, between universal and particular – or, in Heidegger’s parlance,
the difference between Being and beings.2
The fact is, however, that the terms ‘metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’, like many
other terms in philosophy, are highly over-determined, and their meaning
and use vary with different philosophers and in different traditions. Moreover,
in European philosophy, especially since Hegel and Heidegger, the develop-
ment of metaphysics and ontology has been intimately linked to the rereading
and retrieval of various figures in the history of philosophy. In Hegel, these
figures tended to be taken up as moments in the dialectic, whereas Heidegger
tended to read previous thinkers as his own contemporaries, rather than
as representatives of a particular period or ‘position’. Most contemporary
European philosophers follow Heidegger in this regard, and often develop
their own thought in the context of their readings of past thinkers. We have
used these two rubrics as our guiding thread in the discussion that follows.
On the one hand, we will attempt to elucidate the sense that is ascribed to
the terms metaphysics and ontology (and their interaction) in several recent
thinkers whose work has focused on these issues (Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel
Levinas, Gilles Deleuze, Alain Badiou). On the other hand, we will contextual-
ize the trajectories of these thinkers by examining the positions some of their
primary historical interlocutors – notably Kant and Heidegger. The result
will be a partial but hopefully perspicuous overview of the complex issues
involved in contemporary debates in continental metaphysics and ontology.
Ontology in the European tradition is resolutely post-Kantian and post-
Heideggerian: it was Heidegger who renewed interest in ontology in European
philosophy, following Kant’s attempt to determine the legitimacy and scope
of traditional metaphysics. In Kant, the difference between ontology and
metaphysics can be summarized in the difference between two types of con-
cepts: categories and Ideas. ‘The proud name of an Ontology’, Kant famously
wrote, ‘must give place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of pure under-
standing’ (which has sometimes been called a ‘metaphysics of experience’)
(Kant, 1929, A247/B303, p. 264). Kant defined a category as a concept of
the understanding that can be said of every object of possible experience. The
concepts ‘red’ and ‘rose’ are not categories, since not all objects are roses, and
not all roses are red; but ‘causality’ is a category because we know, prior to
experience, that it is a universal predicate that can be said of every object of
experience (every object has a cause and is itself the cause of other things).
More precisely, a category is more than a predicate. It is a condition, a condi-
tion of possible experience: it is the categories that define the domain of pos-
sible experience; they tell us what it means for any object whatsoever to be. In
Aristotle’s language, the categories are the different senses in which Being is
said of beings, they are the different senses of the word ‘Being’. In Heidegger’s
formulation, the categories are the fundamental ‘determinations of the Being
The Continuum Companion to Continental Philosophy
 56 
of beings’ (Heidegger, 1988, p. 102; cf. p. 117). Numerous philosophers have
proposed tables of categories: Aristotle proposed a list of ten categories; Kant
proposed an alternative list of twelve, derived from the model of judgment.3
An Idea, by contrast, is the concept of an object that goes beyond or transcends
any possible experience.4 In the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’, the longest section
of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sets out to expose the three great terminal
points of traditional metaphysics – the Soul, the World and God – as illusions
internal to reason itself. We can know a priori that there is no object that could
correspond to such Ideas; we can never have a ‘possible experience’ of them.
The aim of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, in the Critique of Pure Reason,
is to distinguish between the illegitimate (transcendent) Ideas of traditional
metaphysics, and the legitimate (immanent) categories that determine the
domain of possible experience, or ontology.5
The greatness of Kant’s critical project, however, lies less in simply having
demarcated the domains of ontology and metaphysics than in tracing out
their complex interactions. Kant himself assigned to transcendent Ideas a
positive and legitimate use as ideal focal points or horizons outside experience
that posit the unity of our conceptual knowledge as a problem; as such, they
can help regulate the systematization of our scientific knowledge, and serve
as the postulates of practical reason (we act morally as if there were a God
and a soul). Heidegger, in his influential Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
emphasized the foundational role played in Kant by the temporal powers of
the productive imagination – schematizing and synthesizing – without which
the categories could never determine the spatio-temporal dynamisms of
experience (Heidegger, 1962b). In the Critique of Judgment, one of the most
remarkable texts in the history of philosophy, Kant pushed his earlier analyses
in a new and surprising direction: when synthesis breaks down, it produces
the sentiment of the sublime; and a schema, when freed from the legislation
of the understanding, is capable of becoming a symbol (a white lily is an
analogue of the Idea of Innocence). In both these cases, Kant attempted to
show that there is a presentation of Ideas that is immanent within experience itself,
even if this presentation is negative, indirect or ‘analogical’. The Critique of
Judgment thus configured the relation between ontology and metaphysics in a
more complex manner than the Critique of Pure Reason, setting the agenda for
Romanticism and German Idealism, and their current revival (for instance,
in the debates concerning the metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings
of Hegel; for a perspicuous analysis see Lumsden, 2008).
Post-war French philosophy was similarly engaged in the problems sur-
rounding Kant’s critique of metaphysics. Jean-François Lyotard, for instance,
wrote extensively on the concept of the sublime (the presentation of the
unpresentable) in his effort to think the distinction between the modern and
the ‘post-modern’ (see Lyotard, 1984 and 1994). More importantly, perhaps,
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Jacques Derrida’s later work, which focuses on pure Ideas such as the gift,
hospitality, forgiveness, justice, democracy and so forth, was presented by
Derrida himself as a practical variant of Kant’s ‘Transcendental Dialectic’.6
Kant had already shown that, whenever we speak of something ‘pure’ we are
outside the realm of possible experience, which always presents us with
impure mixtures.7 Similarly, Derrida shows that a pure gift is an impossibility,
since when I accept the gift and say ‘Thank you’, I am in effect proposing, in a
movement of re-appropriation, a kind of equivalence between the giving and
my gratitude, thereby incorporating the transcendent logic of the pure gift
into an immanent economy of exchange and debt. We can think the pure gift,
we can even desire it, but we never encounter it in experience. When Derrida
was looking for a term to describe the formal status of concepts (or rather,
‘quasi-concepts’) such as the gift, he initially thought of adopting the Kantian
term ‘antinomy’, but decided to use the Greek term ‘aporia’ instead, in order
to distance himself from Kant (the fundamental difference between Kantian
Ideas and Derridean quasi-concepts is their temporal status) (Derrida, 1993,
p. 16).8 The fundamental aporia of the pure Ideas analyzed by Derrida is that
the condition of their possibility is their very impossibility – which is why he
describes his list of quasi-concepts as ‘so many aporetic places or dislocations’
with Being (Derrida, 1993, p. 15). In general, one might say that, after Kant,
there remained two ways of doing metaphysics: either (1) by returning to pre-
critical metaphysics (whether or not one remains preoccupied with the trad-
itional metaphysical problems of the existence of God, the immortality of the
soul, or the freedom of the will); or (2) by attempting to develop a rigorously
post-Kantian metaphysics that jettisons the Idea of the Self, the World, and
God (even if this meant returning to pre-Kantian thinkers such as Hume,
Spinoza and Leibniz from a post-Kantian viewpoint). Most subsequent meta-
physics in the European tradition has followed this latter route, taking Kant’s
critique as a fait accompli. If there is to be a post-Kantian metaphysics, it must
be a metaphysics that, in Deleuze’s words, ‘excludes the coherence of the
thinking subject, of the thought world, and of a guarantor God’ (1994, p. 58,
translation modified). Deleuze’s development of a purely immanent theory
of Ideas in Difference and Repetition is perhaps the most radical attempt to
reconcile metaphysics and ontology in the post-Kantian context.
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time inaugurated the renewal of interest in
ontology in European philosophy, and took it in a new direction.9 Heidegger
emphasized the importance of what he called the ‘ontological difference’
between Being (das Sein) and beings (das Seiende). For Heidegger, metaphysics
is the domain of thought that concerns itself with beings (the ontic). Utilizing
a medieval distinction, special metaphysics (metaphysica specialis) concerns
the ‘regional ontologies’ of the various sciences (biology examines the being
of living organisms; theology examines the nature of God as the highest
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being etc.) whereas general metaphysics (metaphysica generalis) examines the
most general concepts that can be predicated of any possible being, or all
beings as a whole (such as Kant’s categories). But if metaphysics constitutes
the root of philosophy, the soil from which it draws its nourishment is ontol-
ogy.10 Rather than examining specific beings, or the nature of beings in gen-
eral, ontology asks the question of Being itself (the ontological), and in this
sense, every metaphysics can be said to presuppose an ontology (Heidegger,
1975). For Kant, the problem with metaphysics is that it is the locus of tran-
scendent illusions, whereas for Heidegger, the problem with metaphysics is
that it has forgotten and concealed the question of Being.11
Heidegger wrote Being and Time as a propaedeutic to his investigation into
this question of Being.12 The book poses the preliminary question: What are the
conditions under which the question of Being can even be asked? To do
this Heidegger undertakes an existential analytic of ‘Dasein’ as a parallel to
the transcendental analytic undertaken by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Whereas Kant’s analytic provided a deduction of the categories as the condi-
tions of possibility for objects and our knowledge of objects (a metaphysics
of experience), Heidegger’s analytic attempts to deduce the fundamental
categories of Dasein’s existence, which he thus calls existentialia rather than
categories. If categories concern the being of objects (What?), existentialia
concern the being of Dasein (Who?), starting with the fundamental existen-
tialia of Being-in-the-world. But as Kierkegaard had shown, the uniqueness of
Dasein is that it is confronted with two basic existential possibilities: it can
either flee from its own being, which is what takes place in our ‘average
everydayness’ (inauthenticity), or it can choose its own being and disclose
new possibilities for itself (authenticity). This is why it is the fundamental
problems of temporality and truth that come to the fore in Being and Time. The
being of Dasein turns out to be revealed, not in an essence or in a pre-existing
‘human nature’, but in what Heidegger calls the three ‘ex-stases’ of time: in its
authentic existence, Dasein is always outside itself, transcending itself, open
to new possibilities of Being. But if this temporal structure constitutes the
‘truth’ of Dasein’s being, it remains concealed in its everyday existence, which
is why Heidegger argued, famously, that the traditional concept of truth as
adequatio (the correspondence between a proposition and a state of affairs)
found its primordial existential ground in the notion of truth as unconcealed-
ness (aletheia). For there to be a science, a ‘region’ of being must have already
been disclosed. But this process of disclosure requires a type of thinking that is
not merely representational: attaining the ‘truth’ of Being requires a thought
that is not merely directed towards beings as they are already given to us,
but that is capable of disclosing new possibilities of Being.13
For Heidegger, this propaedeutic examination of the being of Dasein
serves as the guiding thread for his interpretation of the concept of Being
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itself, which has a similar structure. If Heidegger calls for an ‘overcoming
(Überwindung) of metaphysics’ or a ‘destruction’ of the history of ontology, it
is because the history of metaphysics itself has consisted of a ‘forgetting’ of
the question of Being, concealing the question itself under various determin-
ations. These determinations of Being have included the Idea in Plato, substan-
tia and actualitas in Medieval philosophy, objectivity in modern philosophy,
technology in modern science, and the will to power in Nietzsche (the last
metaphysician).14 In his own attempt to think and disclose the question of
Being, the later Heidegger turned to the Presocratics, to language, to poetry
(Hölderlin, Rilke). But just as Kant had shown that the true object of an Idea
was a problem, and was grasped in a problematic mode, Heidegger showed that
ultimately the concept of Being is itself a question, that it is grasped in the
mode of questioning. In Plato, famously, the question of Being appears primar-
ily in the form, ‘What is . . .?’ [ti estin?]. Plato wanted to oppose this to all other
forms of questioning – such as Who? Which one? How many? How? Where?
When? In which case? From what point of view? – which he criticized as
minor and vulgar questions of opinion that expressed confused ways of
thinking (see Robinson, 1953, pp. 49–60). Heidegger’s fundamental insight,
in short, was that Being always presents itself to us in a problematic form: it
constantly discloses new possibilities, it is the production of the new, the
creation of difference. Once Being is disclosed in a particular manner, meta-
physics can indeed articulate the categorical truths of both Being qua being
as well as existing beings, and it can conceive of truth ‘in the already deriva-
tive form of the truth of cognitive knowledge and the truth of propositions
that formulate such knowledge’ (Heidegger, 1998, p. 280). But in doing so,
metaphysics ‘drives out every other possibility of revealing’, it blocks access
to Being’s self-disclosure (es gibt), its character as the ‘origin’ of the new
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 27).
We find in Heidegger, then, a new distribution of metaphysics and ontology.
For Kant, ontology determines the domain of possible experience (the cat-
egories of the Transcendental Analytic), whereas what traditional metaphysics
thinks transcends possible experience (the illusory Ideas of the Transcendental
Dialectic). For Heidegger, ontology is the exploration of the question of Being,
whereas metaphysics is what conceals the question of Being, just as ‘average
everydayness’ separates Dasein from its own being (the Existential Analytic).
To some degree, every subsequent philosopher in Europe has worked in
Heidegger’s shadow, whether positively and negatively, and in the remainder
of this essay, we will briefly chart out the four Heideggerian paths taken by
Levinas, Derrida, Deleuze and Badiou.
Emmanuel Levinas offered a critique of Heidegger that separated ontology
and metaphysics in a new manner: the two central claims of his Totality and
Infinity are that ‘metaphysics precedes ontology’ and that ‘metaphysics is an
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ethics’ (Levinas, 1969, pp. 42–3, 78–9). Levinas offers a strong critique of
ontology, which he defines as that movement of thought that can only com-
prehend the singularity of things through the mediation of a neutral middle
term, which alone renders being intelligible – such as the generic concept of
category in Aristotle, or even the ‘Being of beings’ in Heidegger. But in this
movement – whatever form it takes – the singularity of the existent, its alterity,
is neutralized; the other is reduced to the same and thematized, possessed.
Levinas’s metaphysical project has a twofold aim. First, in general terms, it
attempts to reverse this movement, to ‘escape from being’, to assert the pri-
macy of the other over the same, and to recover a primordial relationship with
alterity (Levinas, 1985, p. 59). Guided by the formal structures of the ‘idea of
the infinite’ in Descartes’ Meditations and the ‘Good beyond Being’ (agathon
epekeina tes ousias) in Plato’s Republic, Levinas argues that what he calls the
‘metaphysical relation’, which is prior to ontology, is a relation with a radically
absolute and transcendent Other (the infinite, the Good) that cannot be thought,
and is not a concept, a representation or a thematization (Levinas, 1969, p. 211).
What then is it? This is the second pole of Levinas’s thought. For Levinas, the
relation with the Other is an ethical relation, and not a relation of knowledge.
Much of Levinas’ work is devoted to exploring the structures through which
the metaphysical relation is concretized in the ethical relation: (1) the alterity
of the face of the other, which signifies the other’s transcendence; (2) the com-
mand of the other (‘Thou shalt!’), which is not convertible into a content of
consciousness; (3) the fundamental passivity of the I in relation to the com-
mand of the other and (4) the infinite responsibility of the I for the other,
which for Levinas is ‘the essential, primary, and fundamental structure of
subjectivity’ (and not, as for Heidegger, transcendence) (Levinas, 1985, p. 95).
Heidegger himself had written little on ethics, and Levinas’ double revolu-
tion, against both Aristotle and Heidegger, is to have posited ethics as ‘first
philosophy’, and not ontology; and, in a post-Kantian vein, to have re-linked
ethics and metaphysics (transcendence).
In a not dissimilar vein, Jacques Derrida’s early work took over the
Heideggerian task of ‘overcoming metaphysics’ or ‘destroying ontology’. For
Derrida, metaphysics is determined by its structural ‘closure’, and decon-
struction is a means of disturbing this closure, creating an opening or an
interruption. The notion of metaphysical closure itself depends on a move-
ment of transcendence, that is, an ‘excess over the totality, without which no
totality would appear’ (Derrida, 1980, p. 117). Since one cannot transcend
metaphysics as such – there is no ‘outside’ to the metaphysical tradition – one
can only destructure or deconstruct metaphysics from within. The project of
‘overcoming metaphysics’, in other words, is an impossibility, but it is this
very impossibility that conditions the possibility of ‘deconstruction’. Rather
than trying to get outside metaphysics, one can submit ‘the regulated play of
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philosophemes’ in the history of philosophy to a certain slippage or sliding
that would allow them to be read as ‘symptoms of something that could not be
presented’ in metaphysics (Derrida, 1981, pp. 6–7).15 Immanent within meta-
physics, there lies a formal structure of transcendence that can never be made
present as such, but that nonetheless functions as the ‘quasi-transcendental’
condition of metaphysics itself. Derrida thus situates his work, he says, at
‘the limit of philosophical discourse’, at its margins, its borders or boundary
lines (Derrida, 1981, p. 6). Derrida attempts to think this formal structure of
transcendence-within-immanence through concepts such as différance (which
is at best a ‘quasi-concept’, since the notion of a concept is itself metaphysical).
If metaphysics is defined in terms of presence, then différance is that which
marks ‘the disappearance of any originary presence’ (Derrida, 1983, p. 168),
that which thereby exceeds or transcends metaphysics, and thereby, at the
same time, constantly disrupts and ‘destabilizes’ metaphysics.16 Commenting
on Heidegger’s notion of the ‘ontological difference’, Derrida writes that
there may be a difference still more unthought than the difference between
Being and beings. . . . Beyond Being and beings, this difference, ceaselessly
differing from and deferring (itself), would trace (itself) (by itself) – this
différance would be the first or last trace if one still could speak, here, of
origin and end. (Derrida, 1984, p. 67)
The long series of notions developed in Derrida’s work – différance, text,
writing, the hymen, the supplement, the pharmakon, the parergon, justice,
messianicity, justice and so on – are all traces of this formal structure of tran-
scendence, marked by their aporetic status. For Derrida, différance is a relation
that transcends ontology, that differs from ontology, that goes beyond or is
more ‘originary’ than the ontological difference between Being and beings.
In this sense, Derrida’s work can be seen as an effort to overcome both meta-
physics and ontology.
Deleuze is one of the few European philosophers who explicitly pursued a
post-Heideggerian metaphysical project. ‘I was the most naïve philosopher of
my generation, the one who felt the least guilt about “doing philosophy” ’,
he once said in an interview. ‘I never worried about overcoming metaphysics’
(Deleuze, 1995, p. 88). In Deleuze, metaphysics and ontology are combined:
ontology is a metaphysics of difference (Being = difference). Heidegger had
himself pointed to such a possibility, despite his separation of metaphysics
and ontology:
When we think the truth of Being, metaphysics is overcome. We can no
longer accept the claim of metaphysics to preside over our fundamental
relation to ‘Being’ or to decisively determine every relation to beings as
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such. But this ‘overcoming of metaphysics’ does not abolish
metaphysics. . . . If our thinking would succeed in its efforts to go back
to the ground of metaphysics, it might well help to bring about a change
in the human essence, a change accompanied by a transformation of
metaphysics. (Heidegger, 1998, p. 279, emphasis added)
What would be the nature of this transformation? Such a transformed meta-
physics would necessarily take as its object the disclosure of Being itself – that
is, the production of the new, the creation of difference – thereby reuniting
what Heidegger had separated. This is the path taken by Deleuze, who
referred to himself as a ‘pure metaphysician’, and whose magnum opus,
Difference and Repetition, can in part be read as a rethinking of Being and Time
(Being is difference, and time is repetition).17
In developing his philosophy of difference, Deleuze’s Difference and
Repetition, like Heidegger’s Being and Time, begins with a discussion of
Aristotle, since it was Aristotle who bequeathed to later thinkers the funda-
mental problem of metaphysics. To modify a famous phrase of Whitehead’s,
metaphysics can be seen as a series of footnotes to Aristotle (cf. Whitehead,
1979, p. 39). Aristotle had a solution to Heidegger’s question of the ‘onto-
logical difference’ that he summarized in a well-known thesis: different things
differentiate themselves only through what they have in common. Two terms are
said to differ when they are other, not by themselves, but by belonging to
some other definable thing (the One becomes two). Aristotle had dis-
tinguished between three types of difference – specific, generic and individual
difference – but what is ‘common’ for each of these three types of difference is
not the same: the relation of species to their common genus is not the same as
the relation of individuals to their common species, or the relation of categor-
ies to each other and to ‘Being’. In Deleuze’s reading, though, Aristotle’s
metaphysics subordinates difference to four interrelated principles: identity in
the concept and the opposition of predicates (specific difference), resemblance
in perception (individual difference), and the analogy of judgment (generic
difference). Deleuze’s philosophy of difference can be seen as a kind of sys-
tematic rethinking of the problems generated by Aristotle’s metaphysics.
What is wrong with Aristotle’s metaphysics? Put simply, it provides an
inadequate solution to the Heideggerian problematic of ontological difference.
On the one hand, it cannot posit Being as a common genus without destroying
the very reason one posits it as such, that is, the possibility of being for specific
differences; it can therefore conceive of the supposed ‘universality’ of the
concept of Being only as a quasi-identity. On the other hand, it has to relate
Being to particular beings, but it cannot say what constitutes their individuality:
it retains in the particular (the individual) only what conforms to the general
(the concept). An equivocal or analogical concept of Being, in other words,
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can only grasp that which is univocal in beings. A true universal is lacking,
no less than a true singular: Being has only a distributive common sense, and
the individual has no difference except a general and reflexive one in the
concept.18 To overcome these limitations of Aristotle’s metaphysics, Deleuze
proposes two fundamental theses. On the one hand, he systematically con-
trasts the ‘analogy of Being’ (Being is said in several senses) with the doctrine
of the ‘univocity of being’ (Being is said in a single sense). There are indeed
forms of Being, but unlike the categories, these forms introduce no division
into Being and do not imply a plurality of ontological senses. On the other
hand, the single sense of Being is difference, which constitutes a field of indi-
viduation that precedes generic, specific and even individual differences. In
this manner, the universal (univocal Being) is said immediately of the most
singular (difference), independent of any mediation. If Deleuze considers
himself to be a Spinozist, it is because this is precisely the ontological pro-
gramme laid out in the opening of Spinoza’s Ethics: the attributes are irreducible
to genera or categories because while they are formally distinct they remain
equal and ontologically one; and the modes are irreducible to species because
they are distributed in the attributes as individuating differences or degrees
of power, which relate them immediately to a univocal being (substance).
Perhaps no one has gone further than Deleuze in exploring the consequences
of this metaphysical realignment of ontology.
On the one hand, Spinoza carried the univocity of Being to its highest point
through a profound re-conceptualization of the notion of substance. From
Aristotle through Descartes, philosophy defined the individual as a substance,
even if the comprehension and definition of substance varied. Descartes’ con-
cept of substance, for instance, remains equivocal since it is said in at least
three senses (body, soul and God), and these three types of substance are
substances only by analogy, each being defined by a different ‘essential’
attribute (extension, thought and infinite perfection). Spinoza’s revolution was
to make substance equivalent to Being qua Being: Being is itself an absolutely
infinite, unique and univocal substance (Deus sive natura), whose constitutive
elements are the attributes (thought and extension).19 There is no other sub-
stance apart from Being, and the concept of substance thus has a univocal
sense. Unlike Aristotle’s categories, the attributes do not introduce a plurality
of ontological senses into Being, nor is there any hierarchical superiority of
one attribute over the other (parallelism). In his own writings, Deleuze will
simply take the final step and eliminate the notion of substance entirely. ‘All
Spinozism needed to do for the univocal to become an object of pure affirm-
ation’, he writes, ‘was to make substance turn around the modes’ (Deleuze,
1994, p. 304).
One the other hand, Spinoza’s conception of ‘beings’ is even more revo-
lutionary. Beings are not substances, nor do they have attributes or properties
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(since substance is Being itself, and the attributes are the elements of Being).
What then are beings? Beings are modes, that is, they are manners of Being,
modifications of substance – they are degrees of power. Beings that are dis-
tinguished by their degree of power realize one and the same univocal being,
except for the difference in their degree of power. Aristotle sought the prin-
ciple of individuation (1) in the particular attributes or properties (specific
differences) (2) of fully constituted individuals, and Spinoza shows the unten-
ability of Aristotle’s position on both these points.20 First, what is it that
determines the relevant property that makes individuals part of the species
‘human’? The human can be defined as a rational animal, a featherless biped,
an animal of erect stature, an animal who laughs or who uses language and so
on. The choice of any one of these traits, however, is accidental and variable:
abstractions such as ‘genus’ or ‘species’, ‘classes’ or ‘kinds’, depend as much
on the needs and motivations of classifier as on the nature of the objects being
classified. Natural history had its foundation in Aristotle: it defined an animal
by what it is, it sought its qualitative essence (analogy of Being). Modern
ethology, by contrast, under a Spinozistic inspiration, defines an animal by
what it can do, it seeks its quantitative power, that is, its capacity to be affected
(univocity of Being): what affects is a being capable of sustaining? What exci-
tations does it react to? What are its nutrients and poisons? What affects
threaten a being’s cohesion, diminishing its power, or even destroying it?
What affects enhance its power? From this viewpoint, a workhorse does not
have the same capacity to be affected as a race horse, but rather has affects in
common with the ox. The same criteria can be applied to inanimate physical
objects: what are the affects of a slab of granite? What forces can it tolerate –
for example, the forces of heat or pressure? What are its maximal and minimal
thresholds? In this way, we arrive at immanent ‘types’ of modes of existence
that are more or less general, but which do not have the same criteria as the
abstract ideas of species and kind. (When Nietzsche later spoke of will to
power, he meant something very similar: power is not something the will
wants; rather, power is something that every being has: beings are defined
by the power they have, that is, their capacities and capabilities.)
Second, and more importantly, whereas Aristotle sought the principle of
individuation in the properties of fully constituted individuals, Deleuze finds
it in the processes that account for the genesis of individuals. When Deleuze
says that Being is related immediately to individuating differences, he says:
we certainly do not mean by this latter individuals constituted in
experience, but that which acts in them as a transcendental principle: as
a plastic, anarchic and nomadic principle, contemporaneous with the
process of individuation, no less capable of dissolving and destroying
individuals than of constituting them temporally; intrinsic modalities of
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being, passing from one ‘individual’ to another, circulating and
communicating underneath matters and forms. (Deleuze, 1994, p. 38)
The list of notions that Deleuze develops in Difference and Repetition –
difference, repetition, singularity, virtuality, problematic etc. – are all differen-
tial notions that describe the composition of this field of individuation
(though they do not describe a list of categories).21 If Deleuze, following
Simondon, critiques Aristotle’s hylomorphic schema, it is because this field
of individuation precedes both matter and form. Matter is never completely
inert – it always contains incipient structures, potentials for being formed in
particular directions or ways (clay is more or less porous, wood is more or
less resistant); and form is never simply imposed from the outside, since it
can only work by translating or ‘transducing’ itself into a material by a series
of transformations that transmit energy, and thereby ‘inform’ matter (iron
melts at high temperature, marble or wood split along their veins and fibres).
In other words, there is an individuating process of modulation at work
behind both form and matter.
Deleuze’s entire ontology entails a practical conversion in philosophy,
which Deleuze describes as a shift away from morality to ethics. Morality is
fundamentally linked to the notion of essence and the analogical vision of the
world. In Aristotle, the essence of the human is to be a rational animal. If we
nonetheless act in irrational ways, it is because there are accidents that turn us
away from our essential nature: our essence is a potentiality that is not neces-
sarily realized. Morality can therefore be defined as the effort to rejoin man’s
essence, to realize one’s essence. In an ethics, by contrast, beings are related to
Being, not at the level of essence, but at the level of existence. Ethics defines a
man not by what he is in principle (his essence), but by what he can do, what
he is capable of (his power). Since power is always effectuated – it is never a
potentiality, but always in act – the question is no longer ‘what must you do
in order to realize your essence?’ but rather ‘what are you capable of doing by
virtue of your power?’ The political problem, in turn, concerns the effectu-
ation of this power. What conditions allow one’s power to be effectuated in
the best fashion? Conversely, under what conditions can one actually desire
to be separated from one’s power? One can see clearly how these ontological
questions form the basis for the ethico-political philosophy (and correspond-
ing ‘existential’ notions) developed by Deleuze and Guattari in Capitalism
and Schizophrenia, and how Deleuze’s philosophy forms a systematic whole.22
The philosophy of Alain Badiou – which is organized around the three
poles of Being, the event, and the subject – once again separates metaphysics
and ontology. Badiou’s magnum opus, Being and Event, opens with a con-
sideration of Parmenides’ problem of the One and the Multiple: whereas
beings are plural, and are thought in terms of multiplicity, Being itself is
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thought to be singular; it is thought in terms of the One (Badiou, 2005, pp. 23–4).
Badiou resolves this problem with an axiomatic decision: the One is not.
The discourse of ontology (the science of Being qua being), Badiou will argue,
is given to us in mathematics, and more precisely, in axiomatic set theory
(Zermelo-Frankl), precisely because the latter provides us with a pure theory
of the multiple. Metaphysics, by contrast, is always a metaphysics of the
One: ‘We can define metaphysics as the commandeering of being by the one’
(Badiou, 2006, p. 42). By the ‘One’, Badiou means two things. On the one
hand, the One implies any attempt to totalize Being qua being, or to think
multiplicity as a whole. Many thinkers before Badiou have claimed that the
Whole is neither given nor givable: Kant argued that the Idea of the Whole
is a transcendent illusion; Bergson argued that the Whole is equivalent to
the Open, since it is the constant production of the new. Badiou arrives at the
same de-totalizing conclusion through the path of formalization: there can
be no set of all sets without falling into contradiction (Russell’s paradox).
Consequently, Being qua being always presents itself as a non-totalizable
multiplicity – a pure and inconsistent multiplicity (‘the multiple is radically
without-oneness, in that it itself comprises multiples alone’) (Badiou, 2006,
p. 47). But from this point of view, on the other hand, the ‘one’ exists only
as an operation (the ‘count-as-one’) that renders a multiplicity consistent.23
Thus, the ‘one’ also implies that beings – entities, quiddities – are themselves
unities. On this score, Badiou likes to cite Leibniz’s maxim as the central tenet
of metaphysics: ‘That which is not one being is not a being’ (Badiou, 2006,
p. 42). Badiou thus accepts the problem bequeathed to philosophy by
Heidegger, but without accepting Heidegger’s solution: ‘Can one undo this
bond between Being [ontology] and the One [metaphysics], break with the
metaphysical domination of Being by the One, without ensnaring oneself in
Heidegger’s destinal apparatus?’ (Badiou, 2006, p. 42). Badiou frees himself
from the ‘metaphysical temptation’ of the One through his appeal to axio-
matic set theory: Being qua being is the thought of the pure multiple, and
beings themselves are multiples of multiples.
If the event constitutes the second pole of Badiou’s philosophy, it is because
set theory itself comes up against its own internal impasses, such as Russell’s
paradox or the problem of the continuum.24 In Lacanian terms, if set theory
provides Badiou with a formalization of the ‘symbolic’, then the ‘real’ is the
impasse or internal gap that axiomatic formalization confronts internally.
These impasses constitute the site of what Badiou calls ‘events’. As such,
events appear in Badiou’s work under a double characterization. Negatively,
so to speak, an event is undecidable or indiscernible from the ontological
viewpoint of axiomatics: it is not presentable in the situation, but exists (if it
can even be said to exist) on the ‘edge of the void’ as a mark of the infinite
excess of the inconsistent multiplicity over the consistent sets of the situation.
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Put simply, an event is that which cannot be discerned within ontology; it
is the ‘impossible’ of a situation, even if it is immanent to the situation.
Positively, then, it is only through a purely subjective ‘decision’ that the hith-
erto indiscernible event can be affirmed, and made to intervene in a situation.
Lacking any ontological status, the event in Badiou is instead linked to a
rigorous conception of subjectivity, the subject being the sole instance capable
of ‘naming’ the event and maintaining a fidelity to it through the declaration
of an axiom (such as ‘all men are equal’, in politics; or ‘I love you’, in love).
In this sense, Badiou’s philosophy of the event is, at its core, a philosophy of
the ‘activist subject’: it is the subject that names the indiscernible, the generic
set, and thus nominates the event that recasts ontology in a new light.
As in Heidegger, the concept of truth likewise receives a new determination
in Badiou’s work. If Badiou holds that ‘philosophy is originally separated
from ontology’ (Badiou, 2005, p. 13), it is because philosophy itself is con-
ditioned by events. And if Badiou distinguishes truth from knowledge, it is
because knowledge is what is transmitted, what is repeated, whereas truth
is something new, it is a break from accepted knowledge. A truth process
appears because an event has interrupted the transmission and repetition
of knowledge. Badiou identifies four domains in which the production of
truth operates, and which serve as the condition of philosophy: art (e.g. the
appearance of theatrical tragedy with Aeschylus), science (e.g. the eruption of
mathematical physics in Galileo), politics (e.g. the French Revolution of 1792),
and love (an amorous encounter that changes one’s life). These four domains
mark out the instances of individual or collective subjectivity. Badiou dis-
tinguishes between the construction of a truth from an event, and its forcing,
which implies the fiction of a completed truth. To say ‘I love you’ is a finite
declaration, a subjective choice; but to say ‘I will always love you’ is a forcing,
the anticipation of an infinite love. Galileo’s claim that ‘all nature can be
written in mathematical language’ is the forced hypothesis of a complete
physics. ‘In a finite choice there is only the construction of a truth, while in
infinite anticipation of complete truth there is something like power’ (Badiou,
2002). This potency of truth goes beyond the subject of truth, but also contains
the possibility of a ‘disaster’, that is, a total knowledge that destroys the con-
dition of truth itself (the event, the point of the ‘real’ in a situation). As in
Heidegger, one finds in Badiou a reconfiguration of the relations between
ontology, metaphysics, and truth that makes it one of the most original and
radical of contemporary philosophies.
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17 In this respect the question that seems of real interest is the relationship between the
account of Hegel Malabou gives and the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, not least in the
account the latter is attempting of the ‘deconstruction of Christianity’. See Nancy
(2008a, 2008b).
18 This is due to the process of simplification of the past through the formation of
culture. Malabou describes this simplification eloquently in Chapter 10 of The
Future of Hegel.
19 For an engaging discussion of the essential nature of comedy in Hegel’s view see
Rose (1994).
20 This claim is made in Heidegger’s 1930s lecture course on Nietzsche in the context
of an argument for separating Nietzsche from biologism and so is, to say the least,
an ambiguous verdict. See the translations of these courses in Heidegger (1991). For
a distinctly different emphasis, see Heidegger (1977).
21 A celebrated account of the relationship between will to power and eternal return is
given in Müller-Lauter (1999).
22 For a scintillating account of Nietzsche’s view of ecstasy and a placing of it in a
tradition of excessive thought, see Marsden (2002).
23 ‘What one has no access to through experience one has no ear for. Now let us
imagine an extreme case: that a book speaks of nothing but events which lie outside
the possibility of general or even of rare experience – that it is the first language for
a new range of experiences. In this case simply nothing will be heard, with the
acoustical illusion that where nothing is heard there is nothing. . . . This is in fact my
average experience and, if you like, the originality of my experience’ (Nietzsche,
1979, ‘Why I Write Such Excellent Books’, §1).
Chapter 4
1 Kaufmann translates Hinterwelter as ‘afterworldly’, meaning it to be a literal
translation of ‘metaphysics’; see Nietzsche (1954), p. 117.
2 This is one of the primary themes of Adorno’s Metaphysics; see Adorno (2000), esp.
pp. 17–18.
3 Other philosophers have proposed their own lists of ‘categories’, such as Charles
Sanders Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead, but such notions do not have the same
status as Aristotle’s or Kant’s categories.
4 See the great passage in the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant explains and
defends his appropriation of Plato’s notion of an Idea, while modifying its use
(1929, A312–20/B368–77, pp. 309–14).
5 See Kant (1929) A295–6/B352, pp. 298–9: ‘We shall entitle the principles whose
application is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent;
and those, on the other hand, which profess to pass beyond these limits, transcend-
ent’. It should be noted that the terms ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’ are not
identical terms, and in fact are opposed to each other. The aim of Kant’s transcen-
dental or critical project is to discover criteria immanent to the understanding that
are capable of distinguishing between legitimate (immanent) and illegitimate
(transcendent) uses of the syntheses of consciousness. In this sense, transcendental
philosophy is a philosophy of immanence, and implies a ruthless critique of
transcendence.
6 See Derrida (1992), p. 30: ‘The effort of thinking or rethinking a sort of transcen-
dental illusion of the gift should not be seen as a simple reproduction of Kant’s
critical machinery. . . . But neither is it a question of rejecting that machinery as old
fashioned’.
7 See Kant (1929), B3, p. 43: ‘A priori modes of knowledge are entitled pure
when there is no admixture of anything empirical’. And A20/B34, p. 66: ‘I term all
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representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in which there is nothing that
belongs to sensation’.
8 See also Derrida (1995), p. 84, where Derrida is still hesitating between the two
terms: ‘The concept of responsibility [would be] paralyzed by what can be called an
aporia or an antinomy’.
9 See Badiou (2005), p. 1: ‘Heidegger is the last universally recognized philosopher’.
10 See Heidegger (1975), p. 275: ‘Metaphysics represents the beingness of beings in
a twofold manner: in the first place, the totality of beings as such with an eye to
their most universal traits (ta kathalon, koinon), but at the same time also the totality
of beings as such in the sense of the highest and there divine being, or God
(onto-theology)’.
11 See Heidegger (1975), pp. 268–9: ‘From its beginning to its completion, the
propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion
of beings and Being’.
12 See Heidegger (1962a), p. 274: ‘To lay bare the horizon within which something like
Being in general becomes intelligible is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of
having any understanding of Being at all – an understanding which itself belongs to
the constitution of the entity called Dasein’.
13 See Heidegger (1975), pp. 268–9: ‘The thinking which is posited by beings as such,
and therefore representational must be supplanted by a different kind of thinking
which is brought to pass by Being itself’.
14 See Heidegger (1962a), p. 44: ‘We are to destroy this traditional content of ancient
ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our
first ways of determining the nature of Being’.
15 See also Derrida (1981), p. 10: one must ‘borrow the syntaxic and lexical resources
of the language of metaphysics . . . at the very moment one deconstructs this
language’.
16 ‘Différance, the disappearance of any originary presence, is at once the condition of
possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth’ (Derrida, 1983, p. 168). For
further discussion, see May’s chapter on ‘Philosophies of Difference’ in this volume.
17 See Villani (1999), p. 130: ‘I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician. Bergson says that
modern science hasn’t found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is
this metaphysics that interests me’.
18 For Deleuze’s summary of his criticisms of Aristotle, see Deleuze (1994), pp. 269–70,
and p. 303: ‘The only common sense of Being is distributive, and the only indi-
vidual difference is general’.
19 It would nonetheless be an error to suggest that Spinoza’s Ethics begins with
substance: in the order of definitions in Book One of the Ethics, God is not reached
until Definition Six; and in the order of demonstrations, God is not reached
until Propositions Nine and Ten. Strictly speaking, Spinoza’s ontology has a
beginning that is distinct from Being (something which ‘is not’), but in Spinoza this
‘something’ is not the transcendence of the One beyond Being, but rather the
immanence of the attributes as the source and origin of substance or Nature, its
constitutive elements. See Deleuze (2004), pp. 146–55.
20 See Deleuze (1994), p. 38: Aristotle ‘retains in the particular only that which
conforms to the general (matter and form), and seeks the principle of individuation
in this or that element of fully constituted individuals’.
21 See Deleuze (1994), pp. 284–5: ‘None of this amounts to a list of categories. It is
pointless to claim that a list of categories can be open in principle: it can be in fact
but not in principle. For categories belong to the world of representation, where
they constitute forms of distribution according to which Being is distributed among
beings following the rules of sedentary proportionality. That is why philosophy
Notes
377
had often been tempted to oppose notions of a quite different kind to categories,
notions which are really open and which betray an empirical and pluralist sense of
Ideas: “existential” as against essential, percepts as against concepts, or indeed the
list of empirico-ideal notions that we find in Whitehead, which makes Process and
Reality one of the greatest books of modern philosophy’.
22 For further discussion of the distinction between ethics and morality in relation to
ethico-political philosophy, see Williams’ chapter on ‘Ethics and Politics’ in this
volume.
23 See Hallward (2003), p. 90: ‘Consistency is the attribute of a coherent presentation of
such inconsistent multiplicity as a multiplicity, that is, as a coherent collecting of
multiplicity into unity, or one’. Hallward’s book is the best study of Badiou’s
thought available: it is both comprehensive and critical, although it was published
before the 2006 appearance of the second volume of Being and Event.
24 Badiou (2005), p. 5: ‘The essence of the famous problem of the continuum was
that in it one touched upon an obstacle intrinsic to mathematical thought, in which
the very impossibility which founds the latter’s domain is said’.
Chapter 5
1 There is an archaic sense of the English word ‘sense’ meaning ‘direction’, as in ‘the
sense of the river’. This sense is still present in French, as in, among other uses, the
expression sens unique for ‘one-way street’ (Protevi, 1994 and 1998).
Chapter 6
1 The term différance is not always the one Derrida uses, and his different terms
sometimes reflect differences in the particular philosopher he is treating. Neverthe-
less, in reflecting on deconstruction, he writes, ‘The word “deconstruction”, like
all other words, acquires its value only from its inscription in a chain of possible
substitutions, in what is too blithely called a “context”. For, me, for what I
have tried and still try to write, the word has interest only within a certain context,
where it replaces and lets itself be determined by such other words as “écriture”,
“trace”, “différance”, “supplement”, “hymen”, “pharmakon”, “marge”, “entame”,
“parergon”, etc.’ (Derrida, 1985).
Chapter 8
1 While I do not think there is a ‘political turn’ in Derrida’s works, as represented by
Specters of Marx, there is an issue that is very much worth investigating, namely that
in the later work, Derrida argues that justice, like deconstruction itself, cannot be
deconstructed – therefore deconstruction is justice and vice-versa – whereas, in Of
Grammatology, Derrida says that deconstruction must submit to its own critique.
2 Again we might remark upon the resources for historical materialism that
come through the Western monotheistic traditions and texts, and we might there-
fore raise some historical materialist questions concerning the preoccupation with
the figure of St Paul in the work of Badiou, Zˇizˇek, Agamben and others. In the
readings of Badiou and Zˇizˇek, Paul is singular, and in his singularity and indeed
atemporality/ahistoricity he founds Christianity. Perhaps this ought to be called
the ‘dialectical materialist’ view of the matter (Badiou and Zˇizˇek say as much),
while a historical materialist reading of the New Testament would see an Early
Christian Movement that was multivocal – even after the process of canonization
had removed many other accounts of Jesus of Nazareth and his movement. We get
to dialectical materialism by removing the rock, as it were – Peter.
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